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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWE RENTS CORPORATION, 
Plaintif !-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN WORTHEN, dba Exotic 





STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action at law based on a written con-
tract of bailment for damage done to plaintiff's 
equipment while in the possession of the defendant 
as bailee thereof. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the lower court, sit-
ting without a jury, and, after receiving in evidence 
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the contract and the stipulations of counsel as, 
the facts, judgment was granted to plaintiff. D. 
f e~1dant made a motion to the lower court for a ne'. 
trial, which motion was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmation of the judgment 1 
the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff operates an equipment rental bmi 
ness located at 2375 South State Street, Salt La];. 
City, Utah. On August 4, 1962, at approximate!: 
6 :00 P.M., the defendant came to plaintiff's businfr 
establishment and leased from plaintiff a large rnor 
tar mixer which was delivered to the defendant an 
retained by him in his possession under his sole car1 
and keeping until August 6, 1962, at approxirnatfr 
5 :00 P.M. ( R. 25, 26). Defendant, in connection wit: 
the rental of the mortar mixer, signed and executt 
a rental agreement, and paid a deposit on said rent: 
in the amount of $50.00. The rental agreement, & 
executed by defendant, stated in part: 
"Lessee acknowledges receipt of tr 
equipment in good working condition and rr 
pair, and agrees to return it in as good cN 
dition subject to reasonable wear and tea: 
and L~ssee shall be liable for all damage to' 
loss of the equipment regardless of cause ?nr 
it shall have been returned to and rece1ptt 
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fo1· by the Lessor .... None of the above 
equipment ... shall ... be removed from the 
county in which it was delivered to the lessee 
except by prior written consent of lessor ... " 
(Exh. P. 1) 
On August 6, 1966, at approximately 5 :00 P.M., 
while defendant was traveling north on U. S. High-
way 89 near Ogden, Weber County, Utah, the mortar 
mixer became detached from defendant's vehicle, 
orerturned and was damaged. This incident occurred 
approximately 47 hours after defendant first gained 
possession of the mortar mixer and outside of the 
county in which it was delivered to the lessee. 
The allegations set forth in the last three para-
graphs of appellanfs Statement of Facts are not 
included in the Findings of Fact of the lower court 
(R. 25-27). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
A CONTRACT ALLOCATING THE RISK OF 
LOSS OF A BAILED CHATTEL MAKING THE 
BAILEE THE INSURER THEREOF DOES NOT 
VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY AND IS ENFORCE-
ABLE ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS. 
A. The rights and obligations of parties to a 
contract of bailment are determined by the provi-
sions of the contract. 
B. The contract provision in question does not 
riolate public policy. 
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. C. Defendant's liability with respect to i: 
bailed chattel is explicitly stated in the contract. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT SEEKS ON APPEAL REL![ 
NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF REVIEW OFTH' 
SUPREME COURT. , 
A. The granting or denial of a motion for 
new trial is not a final judgment from which 2 
appeal lies. 
B. Plaintiff's negligence and the cause of da~ 




A CONTRACT ALLOCATING THE RISKO! 
LOSS OF A BAILED CHATTEL MAKING THf 
BAILEE THE INSURER THEREOF DOES NO: 
VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY AND IS ENFORCf 
ABLE ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS. 
A. The rights and obligations of parties to 
contract of bailment are determined by the pror 
sions of the contract. Plaintiff in this action is seel 
ing to be indemnified for damage done to his rent' 
equipment while it was in the possession of the Or 
fondant bailee for a period of nearly 4 7 hours. Tn 
defendant contended at the trial of this matter th~ 
any damage done to plaintiff's equipment was ?ro~ 
mately caused by plaintiff's own negligence ma 
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taching the leased mortar mixer to defendant's 
vehicle. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that 
plaintiff was entitled to recover from defendant for 
the damage done to plaintiff's mortar mixer, and 
in so doing, assumed that plaintiff was negligent, 
and that such negligence was the proximate cause 
of the damage to the mixer, and, therefore necessari-
ly held that the negligence of plaintiff, if any, would 
constitute no defense to plaintiff's claim under the 
terms of the agreement. (R. 26, 27) 
Therefore, the only issue before the Court on 
this appeal is: Is the provision in the contract of 
bailment, placing absolute liability for damage to 
the bailed chattel upon the appellant, enforceable? 
The general rule is that the terms of a contract 
of bailment determine the rights, duties and liabili-
ties of the parties, and that while the care to be 
exercised by the bailee under a general contract of 
bailment is fixed by law, the obligations of the par-
ties under a special contract of bailment are fixed 
primarily by the terms of the contract itself. 8 Am. 
Jur. 2d Bailments, §121, p. 1015. 
This rule is further stated in 8 Am. Jur. 2d. 
Bailments, §137, p. 1032, as follows: 
"A bailee may enlarge his legal responsi-
bility for the subject of the bailment by con-
tract, express or implied, eve~ to the. extent 
of making himself absolutely liable as msurer 
for the loss or destruction of goods committed 
to his care· this is true even of gratuitous 
bailees. As ~ general rule, if there .is an ~x­
press or implied agreement by the bailee which 
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cle~rly . goes beyond hi.s ordinary obligah 
as implied by law, he will be held to his agrt 
ment. I~ such cases the bailment contract 
con.trollmg and must be enforced accordir 
to its terms, irrespective of the fact that 
les.s onerous liability is imposed by law r 
bailees of the same class generally." 
The special contract of bailment under conside~ 
ation here expressly provides that "Lessee shall I 
liable for all damage to or loss of the equipment Jc 
gardless of cause ... " (Exh. p. 1) This provisi~: 
allocated between the parties herein which of theL 
would bear the risk of loss of the rental equipmen 
during the interval of time during which the appt\ 
lant had exclusive control of the bailed article. 
Applying the general rule stated above to tb 
contract in the instant case requires that appellanfi 
duty with respect to damage to the mortar mixeri, 
established by the terms of the written contract o: 
bailment, and that defendant is liable to plaintiff fa 
the damage thereto. 
Such an allocation is a reasonable object of con· 
tract, since a bail or, after delivering a chattel to a 
bailee, no longer has possession and control of t~al 
chattel, and is in no position to examine the artlclt 
bailed, and cannot, therefore, rectify any discover· 
able defects after it has left his possession. 
B. The contract provision in question does_ 1101 
violate public policy. The defendant has attack~d t.h'. 
contractual clause which is relied upon by plamtift 
h. · enl to recover for the damage done to is eqmpm 
as being contrary to public policy since, as contendea 
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by defendant, this contract, if enforced would have . ' 
relie,·ed plaintiff of a duty of care which plaintiff 
owed to the general public. In support of this argu-
ment, he cites the following cases: Union Pacific 
Railroad Company v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 
17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P. 2d 910; Hunter v. American 
Rental Inc., 371 P. 2d 131 (Kan.); Otis Elevator Co. 
1'. Mal'yland Casualty Co., 33 P.2d 97 4 (Colo.). 
Clearly, none of these cases can be held to stand for 
the proposition that it is violative of public policy 
for a bailor of equipment to contract with a bailee 
of that equipment for the bailee to become absolutely 
liable to insure that the article which is bailed will 
be returned in the same condition in which it left 
the bailor's possession. These cases can only be con-
strued to hold that it may be violative of public policy 
to allow a negligent party to a contract to exonerate 
himself from a duty of care owed to the public where 
his negligence results in damage to the non-negligent 
contracting party, or to some third party, and which 
negligence is not specifically anticipated by the con-
tract under consideration. This is especially true in 
the Union Pacific Railroad Company case, supra, in 
which the plaintiff sought indemnification from the 
owner of a pipeline from a claim for damages as-
serted by the estate of an employee of the pipeline 
company killed in a collision with one of the railroad 
company's trains while the employee was on route 
to do maintenance work on the pipeline. The court 
there held that the provision in the written contract 
betwPPn the parties whereby the pipeline compa~y 
Promised to indemnify the railroad from any hab1l-
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ity for injury_ to any person, where such injury aro~ 
out of_ the ex1s_tence of the pipeline, did not proiit 
the railroad with a cause of action against the pir 
1. r me company for the type of loss involved. Becalli 
the collision occurred 1 ¥2 miles from the location 
1 
the pipeline, the court held that there was no cau~, 
connection between the collision and the pipelin, 
and stated: 
"The fair import of the entire provisiol 
considered together in context as it should~ 
is that the damages guaranteed against shoul 
have at least some causal connection with tr 
construction, existence, maintenance or Of· 
eration of the pipeline other than an incider 
which happened merely coincidental to it' 
existence." 
That case, therefore, cannot be held to mean thd 
any contract which would insure against the negl 
gence of one of the parties thereto will violate pubt 
policy, and the court, in its opinion, implies that sue 
a contract would guarantee against certain damagr 
which have a causal connection with the subject mat 
ter of the contract. Clearly there is no such causati~'. 
problem in the instant case, as the type of dama11 
done to plaintiff's equipment was precisely the Bf 
of injury anticipated by the agreement between tt 
parties. The Union Pacific Railroad case is, thel'r 
fore, inapplicable to the case at bar. 
Hunter v. American Rentals, Inc., supra, is al~ 
not in point since that case dealt only with ~n a' 
tempt by a bailor to avoid liability for his negligent' 
by relying on exculpatory clauses in the contract~ 
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bailment, where the damage involved was extensive 
personal injury to the bailee and damage to the 
bailee's personalty. This far-reaching type of in-
demnification is not what is being sought by plain-
tiff in this action. The only loss that occurred in the 
instant case was the damage done to plaintiff's mor-
tar mixer, the bailed chattel, and this damage oc-
curred while the mortar mixer was in the possession 
of the defendant. Defendant suffered no damage at 
all to his person or property, and plaintiff is only 
seeking to assert the contractual provision in the 
agreement by which defendant bound himself to be-
come absolutely liable for any damage done to plain-
tiff's mortar mixer while it was in defendant's 
possession. 
Neither is plaintiff seeking to require defendant 
to indemnify him for damage done to third parties 
by reason of some negligence committed by plaintiff, 
as was the situation in Otis Elevator Company v. 
Maryland Casualty Company, supra. That case dealt 
with an attempt by a negligent party to relieve him-
self of his duty to the public where third parties were 
injured due to that negligence. A different issue 
altogether would be presented by the instant case 
if the assumed negligence of plaintiff had resulted 
in injury to another vehicle on the highway or even 
to defendant's vehicle. To prevent such negligence, 
it might be proper to hold that an attempt to relieve 
oneself by contract from a duty owed to the public 
does violate public policy. However, where the only 
damage done is to plaintiff's equipment while it is 
still in the hands of the defendant, such public policy 
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?learly does not apply since no publicly protec1, 
mterest has been invaded. Therefore, the allocatir 
by contract of the burden of the risk of loss of 
bailed chattel is a legitimate object of contract, ar. 
should be upheld even against the asserted defo,, 
that the loss was proximately caused by the ne~ 
gence of the bailor. Indeed, the public policy of fr~ 
dom of contract is best served by enforcing sucn 
provision, Weik v. Ace Rents, 87 N.W. 2d 3! 
(Iowa), and the contract provision in issue he! 
should be enforced. 
C. Defendant's liability with respect to ti 
bailed chattel is explicitely stated in the contrar 
Finally, defendant argues that the language useoi 
the disputed contractual provision did not specifici 
ly include the words "including negligence of n 
lessor" and was, therefore, not explicit enough'. 
advise defendant that his liability extended to tk 
degree. While, as a general rule, such contracts m 
strictly construed, the court in Griffiths v. Broderfr: 
27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18, 175 A.L.R. 1, stalt 
that express words against negligence need not I• 
used, and that if it is clear from the language USi 
that the parties intended to cover losses arising fro: 
the negligence of the indemnitee, this is sufficien 
It is difficult to see how more comprehensive 1 
inclusive language could have been used than wori 
which stated: "Lessee shall be liable for all darna1 
to or loss of equipment regardless of cause." (Err 
phasis added.) If plaintiff had used the phrase ''h 
eluding negligence of the lessor" in the contract, thi 
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it might be open to question whether the provision 
1ras limited to liability only for such negligence as 
1ras stated by the court in General Accident Fire 
& Life Assurance Corporation v. Sniith & Oby Com-
pany, 272 F. 2d 581, 77 A.L.R. 2d 1134. 
The obvious intent of the provision in question 
cl~arly and unmistakably makes the defendant abso-
lutely liable as insurer for the loss or destruction 
of the equipment which was committed to his care. 
To hold otherwise would be to render the words 
"regardless of cause" devoid of any rational inter-
pretation. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT SEEKS ON APPEAL RELIEF 
KOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF REVIEW OF THE 
SUPREME COURT. 
Although appellant fails to pray in his brief 
for any relief from the Court, nevertheless, if the 
statement under the heading RELIEF SOUGHT ON 
APPEAL (Appellant's Brief p. 1) constitutes a 
prayer for relief, such relief is not available to ap-
pellant on this appeal insofar as he prays for a judg-
ment in his favor, or for a new trial. 
A. The granting or denial of a motion for a new 
trial is not a final judgment from which an appeal 
lies. The foregoing proposition is supported in Has-
lam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 389 P.2d 736; 
Klinqe v. Southern Pacific Company, 89 Utah 284, 
5i P.2d 367; 4 Arn. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error § 123, 
p. 638. Defendant's appeal, then, is properly taken 
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only from the judgment in the instant case and , nr 
from the Order denying his motion for a new tria. 
~n appeal from a denial of a motion for a new bi 
is proper only where the lower court has abused i1 
discretion in denying or granting the moving part·: 
motion. Crellin v. Thornas, 122 Utah 122 247 p'9, ' ... _ 
264. Defendant has not contended in his Brief tha 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying fil 
motion for a new trial and consequently appel!an· 
is not entitled to any relief from this Court by reasor 
of the lower court's denial of that motion. 
B. Plaintiff's negligence and the cause of dam. 
age to plaintiff's chattel are not issues before tlii 
Court. In POINT I of his Brief, appellant attempt; 
to establish, on the basis of allegations contaim~ 
in his Answer to plaintiff's Complaint, and his Af. 
fidavit in support of his motion for a new trial, tho 
plaintiff was negligent in attaching the morta1 
mixer to defendant's vehicle, and that such negli· 
gence was the proximate cause of the damage to ili1 
mixer. The lower court, however, in holding defen~· 
ant liable as a matter of law, assumed, as is stat~ 
above, that plaintiff was negligent, and that sucl. 
negligence was the proximate cause of such damagt 
Appellant's recital of the contents of Title 41-~ 
148.40 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (obviously en· 
acted by the Legislature for the protection of th1 
public, a fact which appellant states in the headini 
to POINT I of his brief), is irrelevant to the issui 
before the Court, i.e., the enforceability of the por· 
tions of the rental contract set forth above sine, 
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the trial court had no need to consider the issues of 
negligence and causation. The most that could be 
granted defendant on this appeal is a remand for 
trial on the issue of his asserted defense that plain-
tiff negligently attached the mortar mixer to de-
fendant's vehicle, and that the negligence of plain-
tiff was the proximate cause of the damage to the 
mortar mixer, and this can only be granted in the 
event this Court reverses the trial court's holding 
that the contract between the parties is determina-
tiYe of defendant's liability. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court on this appeal 
can neither render judgment for defendant, nor 
grant him a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the contract 
provision in question does provide for absolute liabil-
ity on the part of defendant for the damage done to 
plaintiff's mortar mixer while in the possession of 
defendant, that such provision is valid and that it 
should be enforced according to its terms. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. WILLIAM BRADFORD 
JOHN M. BRADLEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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